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INTRODUCTION 
Do participants in mediation and arbitration have attorneys?  Do they 
need them?  Although the phenomenon of pro se litigation has received 
substantial attention in recent years,1 most commentators and policymakers 
have failed to focus on whether participants in mediation, arbitration, or 
other forms of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”)2 need legal assis-
tance.3  Likely, the failure to focus on the possible need for representation 
 
 1. See, e.g., Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Ex-
isting Data Reveal About When Counsel is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 38 
(2010) (urging that programs to assist self-representation and programs to provide counsel 
all be considered part of a larger endeavor to enhance access to justice); Andrew Scherer, 
Securing a Civil Right to Counsel: The Importance of Collaborating, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 675 (2006) (encouraging collaborative efforts to secure a civil right to coun-
sel); Carroll Seron, The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New 
York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
419 (2001) (finding that the provision of legal counsel produces large differences in out-
comes for low income tenants in housing court). 
 2. In a prior article I urged that the phrase ADR is not useful, because the processes 
grouped together are more dissimilar than alike.  Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a 
Form of ADR?: An Argument That the Term “ADR” Has Begun to Outlive its Usefulness, 
2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 98 (2000).  I still believe that.  Nonetheless, I once again find it helpful 
to use the phrase to describe dispute resolution processes that are not litigation because oth-
ers so frequently group these processes together. 
 3. To the extent commentators have focused on the issue of legal representation or its 
absence in ADR, the discussions have typically focused either on how mediators or arbitra-
tors can help pro se parties. See, e.g., Russell Engler, And Justice for All–Including the Un-
represented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1987 (1999); Cynthia E. Nance, Unrepresented Parties in Mediation, 15 NO. 3 
PRAC. LITIG. 47 (2004).  For a discussion of how lawyers ought to be behave when partici-
pating in mediations and arbitrations, see HAROLD I. ABRAMSON, MEDIATION REPRESENTA-
TION: ADVOCATING IN A PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS (2004); JOHN COOLEY, ARBITRATION 
ADVOCACY (2003); DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES 
FOR LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS (1996); Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of 
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in proceedings is based on an often unstated premise that because ADR is 
non-adversarial, or at least less adversarial than litigation, the need for re-
presentation in ADR is necessarily, or at least typically, less than the need 
for representation in litigation.4  Since we have not yet come close to pro-
viding all litigants with attorneys, some may say we should not waste our 
time or energy thinking about the possible unmet need for attorneys in 
ADR processes.  Perhaps the failure to focus on the possible need for re-
presentation in ADR is also based on a misimpression that most mediations 
and arbitrations are informal affairs in which attorneys could do little good 
and might even disrupt the process.5 
This Article suggests that our failure to focus on the possible need for 
representation in mediation and arbitration is fundamentally misguided.  
Although legal representation is no doubt more important in some contexts 
than others, it is wrong to make the binary assumption that legal representa-
tion is always more important in litigation than in ADR processes.  Whe-
reas some may assume that ADR processes are uniformly informal and 
supportive, it turns out that arbitration, and even mediation, can often be 
quite formal and adversarial.  In arbitration, witnesses are often called, ex-
pert testimony presented, and legal arguments made.  As for mediation, it 
too can often involve legal arguments, documents, and presentations by 
lawyers, clients, and experts.  Indeed, as compared to litigation, mediation 
may give attorneys more opportunity to intimidate their opponent with vis-
ual evidence and arguments that the rules of evidence might not permit.6 
If lawyerless ADR is problematic, it is a pervasive issue.  Mediation and 
arbitration have become increasingly prevalent as part of our justice sys-
tem.7  Many jurisdictions are now not only offering mediation and arbitra-
tion as options, but also taking the further step of mandating that parties 
proceed to ADR prior to, or sometimes in lieu of, resolving their claims in 
court.8  In addition, many contracts also require that disputes be resolved 
privately through mediation or arbitration, rather than through litigation.9  
 
Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonad-
versarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 269 (1999). 
 4. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 5. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 6. See Lawrence M. Watson, Effective Legal Representation in Mediation, 2 ALTERNA-
TIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FLORIDA ch. 2, 16-20 (1995) (providing examples of how at-
torneys can use charts, photos and other techniques to convince an opposing client to settle a 
dispute). 
 7. Some praise this trend and others bemoan it, but that is a discussion for another day.  
ADR has clearly arrived, for better or for worse. 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. Some also suggest that ADR may be a way to improve access to the justice system. 
See, e.g., DEBORAH RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 86 (2004) (urging that ADR can be part of a 
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Thus, ADR may be the only form of dispute resolution many disputants 
get.  As for representation, some jurisdictions proscribe the participation of 
attorneys in court-connected ADR processes.10  Other jurisdictions or ADR 
providers may permit or even encourage participants to bring attorneys,11 
but the reality is that participants often do not or cannot retain counsel.12 
Part I will discuss the empirical side of these issues.  How often or under 
what circumstances do participants in mediation and arbitration have attor-
neys?  What appears to be the significance of whether parties are 
represented in ADR processes?  Specifically, is such representation helpful 
to the party?  Does it change the nature of the ADR process itself?  If re-
presentation is important, need the representative be an attorney?  Unfortu-
nately, as this entire area has been under-studied, we will not find clear an-
swers to all of these questions.  But, we will learn that attorneys do seem to 
help in ADR, at least sometimes, and that while attorneys or sometimes 
non-lawyer representatives do participate in ADR, many parties in ADR 
are also unrepresented. 
Part II will examine why lawyers might be important in ADR, drawing 
on the literature and case law discussing the significance of lawyers in oth-
er contexts.  This analysis will cause us to rethink our assumptions regard-
ing whether and when attorneys might be helpful.  Case law and policy dis-
cussions have stated (with little explanation) that it is much more important 
to have legal representation in adversarial than non-adversarial settings.  
Such statements seem to be based on another unchallenged assumption—
that the primary value added by lawyers is their knowledge and skill with 
respect to such matters as fact gathering, legal analysis, procedural rules, 
and presentation of evidence.  This assumption has led people to conclude 
that lawyers are most needed in complex cases, adversarial fora, and where 
the disputants are not particularly well-educated or articulate.  However, as 
Part II.B will discuss, recent social science research suggests that lawyers 
 
cluster of ways to improve access to justice); Rob Rubinson, A Theory on Access to Justice, 
29 J. LEGAL PROF. 89, 142-52 (2004) (asserting that mediation, if properly structured, can 
improve unrepresented clients’ access to justice). 
 10. See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.  Some private programs, such as em-
ployer-imposed arbitration programs, may also proscribe employees from bringing counsel 
with them to the ADR procedure.  E.g., Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in Employment 
Arbitration: Analysis of a New Survey of Employment Arbitration Programs, DISP. RESOL. 
J., Jan. 1997, at 80. 
 11. See, e.g., UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 16 (2000), available at http://www.law. 
upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uarba/arbitrat1213.htm (providing that disputants must be per-
mitted to bring counsel to an arbitration). 
 12. On the other hand, it is also true that some jurisdictions refuse to mandate mediation 
if one or all parties are unrepresented.  See Roselle L. Wissler, The Effectiveness of Court-
Connected Dispute Resolution in Civil Cases, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 55, 71 (2004). 
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may also play other roles, such as balancing power inequalities or provid-
ing emotional support.  Thus, the need for lawyers may be even greater in 
simpler kinds of cases than it is in more complex matters.  Based on law-
yers’ contributions in terms of knowledge and skills as well as power ba-
lancing and emotional support, Part II.C concludes that legal representation 
may often be critically important in ADR processes.  Part II.D rejects the 
idea that neutral arbitration and mediation can entirely take the place of at-
torney advocates.  While some may argue that the presence of attorneys 
may at times undercut the value of mediation or arbitration, Part II.E con-
cludes that this idea is often overstated.  Finally, Part II.F considers wheth-
er non-lawyer representatives (“NLRs”) are as effective as attorneys in 
serving clients’ interests in ADR.  While recognizing that this is at times 
true, this Article asserts that NLRs are no more inherently appropriate in 
ADR proceedings than they are in litigation.  Thus, while we ought to re-
consider the extent to which prohibitions on non-attorney representation 
may impinge on disputants’ access to justice; it is a mistake to assume that 
non-attorney representation is more appropriate in ADR than in litigation. 
Finally, Part III will consider the practical implications of the conclusion 
that disputants in ADR often need legal representation.  Because many dis-
putes will be finally resolved in ADR and because legal representation can 
be equally or even more important in ADR than in litigation, we need to 
focus simultaneously on improving representation in both ADR and litiga-
tion.  Part III suggests that these insights need to be considered by courts 
regulating ADR processes and examining right-to-counsel arguments in 
those processes, by policymakers examining how access to counsel can be 
improved, and by attorneys and legal service organizations determining 
how to allocate their scarce resources. 
I.  AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION IN ADR 
As Professor Wissler emphasizes in her valuable article for this sympo-
sium, very little empirical work has been done examining attorneys’ role 
and impact in mediation.13  We similarly know very little about the extent 
to which participants in arbitration are represented by attorneys, nor the de-
gree to which legal representation in arbitration is significant.  While mul-
tiple books and articles now provide guidance to attorneys regarding how to 
participate in mediation14 or arbitration,15 most of these works do not ex-
 
 13. Roselle L. Wissler, Representation in Mediation: What We Know from Empirical 
Research, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 419, 426 (2010) (noting that only a small number of stu-
dies have been conducted in only a few mediation contexts). 
 14. See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 3; JOHN COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY 15-18 
(2002); Sternlight, supra note 3. 
STERNLIGHT CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:51 PM 
386 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
amine the question of whether attorney representation is rare or common.  
Still, it is worth summarizing the little bit that we think we know. 
A. The Extent of Legal Representation in ADR 
In considering the question of how frequently ADR participants are 
represented by attorneys, it is critically important to remember that ADR 
processes vary tremendously.  To this author, at least, it seems obvious that 
the likelihood of representation in ADR will fluctuate according to factors 
such as which ADR process is being used,16 the nature of the matter in dis-
pute,17 the wealth and character of the disputants,18 and the amount of 
money or other relief at stake in the dispute.19 
Is the phenomenon of pro se disputants less present in ADR than in liti-
gation?  Is there any reason to believe that it is easier for disputants to ob-
tain representation to handle a given dispute in ADR than in litigation?  
Theoretically, this could be true.  If ADR processes were cheaper and 
quicker than litigation, and if plaintiffs could recover as much through 
ADR as they could through taking that same dispute to litigation, then 
plaintiffs’ lawyers would be more eager to handle a particular dispute on 
contingency in the ADR process than in litigation.  On the other hand, if 
 
 15. See, e.g., COOLEY, supra note 3; Tina Drake Zimmerman, Representation in ADR 
and Access to Justice for Legal Services Clients, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 181 
(2003). 
 16. Holding other factors constant, I would expect that representation would be more 
common in arbitration than in mediation.  Arbitration is fairly similar to litigation in that 
evidence is presented and adversarial arguments are made.  Mediation, in contrast, is a faci-
litated settlement discussion.  While evidence can be discussed and legal arguments made, it 
is also possible to hold a mediation that focuses primarily on non-legal interests and con-
cerns.  Thus, disputants may well see a greater need for representation in arbitration than in 
mediation. 
 17. If the parties are disputing the meaning of a statute or a contractual term, legal repre-
sentation will likely be seen as more critical by the disputants than if the core of the dispute 
involves relations between neighbors or family members. 
 18. As Rob Rubinson has ably explained in the litigation context, today, representation 
tends to be limited to disputants who are businesses, wealthy individuals, or able to attract 
the assistance of “cause” organizations.  Rubinson, supra note 9, at 100-02; see also RHODE, 
supra note 9, at 24-46.  Many “normal” people simply can’t afford an attorney, whether as 
plaintiffs, if too little is at stake to warrant contingent fee representation, or as defendants.  
Rubinson, supra note 9, at 102; see also Engler, supra note 1, at 4 (citing studies discussing 
unmet legal needs of the poor, who cannot afford legal representation).  At the same time, 
Herbert Kritzer has also pointed out that the lack of counsel in many cases is attributable to 
disputants’ choices as to when counsel is and is not important.  Herbert M. Kritzer, To Law-
yer or Not to Lawyer, Is that the Question?, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming) (ma-
nuscript at 33-34, on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1004773. 
 19. See RHODE, supra note 9, at 24-26; Rubinson, supra note 9, at 100-02. 
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the payoff were smaller in ADR, or if ADR were no quicker or cheaper 
than litigation, then contingent-fee attorneys would be even more reluctant 
to handle disputes in ADR than in litigation.  Neither studies nor anecdotal 
evidence show that attorneys who are unwilling to litigate a particular mat-
ter on a contingent fee basis are willing to arbitrate or mediate the dispute 
on a contingent fee basis.  With respect to those parties who pay by the 
hour, it similarly may not be any easier to hire an attorney to handle a mat-
ter in ADR than in litigation.  Assuming that disputes are typically resolved 
more quickly in ADR than in litigation, the attorney might well seek a 
higher hourly rate in ADR to make up for the fact that he cannot charge for 
as many hours.  In short, intuitively and theoretically it seems likely that 
most disputants who have a hard time finding attorneys to litigate their dis-
putes will have at least as hard a time finding attorneys to mediate or arbi-
trate those disputes. 
The small number of studies examining attorney representation in ADR 
processes seem consistent with these premises, as does anecdotal informa-
tion.  As Roselle Wissler reports, the few mediation studies conducted to 
date show great variability in the likelihood and nature of representation 
between, for example, family disputes,20 Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission claims, and general civil matters.21  Certainly, well-known 
persons hire attorneys to represent them when their divorces are mediated.  
In the EEO context, those few employees who are union members may of-
ten be represented in mediation by a union representative, rather than an 
attorney.22 
 
 20. There is an impression, if not actual empirical information, that many disputants in 
family cases appear unrepresented at mediation.  See Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the 
Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Media-
tion, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1351 (1995) (“Critics and proponents of mediation alike see 
the absence of lawyers as a defining aspect of divorce mediation.”).  This phenomenon re-
flects not only the inability of many divorcing persons to retain counsel, but also the deci-
sion of many counsel to allow their clients to attend mediation without representation.  As 
McEwen et al. discuss, non-attendance of family mediations is common in many jurisdic-
tions.  Id. at 1331. 
 21. Wissler, supra note 13, at 428-30 (showing that among these three categories, attor-
ney representation was most likely in general civil cases and least likely in Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity (“EEO”) cases, but recognizing that data may be affected with respect to 
court-connected mediation by the fact that some courts exclude cases involving unrepre-
sented parties, from mandatory referral to mediation). 
 22. Lisa B. Bingham et al., Exploring the Role of Representation in Employment Media-
tion at the USPS, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 341, 359, 363-64 (2001) (using data from 
United States Postal Service’s employment mediation program, specifically 7651 data track-
ing reports prepared by mediators and exit surveys prepared by participants, roughly two-
thirds of complainants are represented, although only 3% of complainants had attorney rep-
resentatives). 
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As surmised, arbitration seems to involve attorneys somewhat more of-
ten than other ADR processes.23  Elizabeth Hill and Alexander Colvin have 
found that a substantial number of complainants arbitrating employment 
disputes were represented by attorneys.24  International business disputes 
that are handled through arbitration involve the use of lawyers.25  When bi-
cyclist Floyd Landis arbitrated the charges that he had used drugs to cheat 
in the Tour de France, both he and the regulatory agency were 
represented.26  Similarly, large personal injury matters or class actions that 
are taken to mediation or arbitration typically involve attorneys.27 
B. The Impact of Legal Representation in ADR 
As one thinks about undertaking an empirical examination of the impact 
of legal representation in ADR, many challenges of such a study are imme-
diately evident.  First, how does one measure success in ADR processes?  
In litigation and even arbitration it is fairly well accepted that one should 
look at who is awarded or required to pay a judgment as well as the size of 
that judgment.  In mediation, however, settlements may be far more com-
plex and multi-faceted, involving apologies, future business deals, and non-
monetary relief.  Even more fundamentally, does success depend only on 
 
 23. Historically, arbitration was more informal and less prone to lawyers than it is today.  
For a general discussion of the evolution of arbitration, see Edward Brunet, Replacing Fol-
klore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39 (1999) (discuss-
ing the change in nature of arbitration, from informal/guild to more like litigation) and 
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, availa-
ble at http://home.law.uiuc.edu/lrev/publications/2000s/2010/2010_1/Stipanowich.pdf. 
 24. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity 
Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 407-08, 432 (2007) (find-
ing, in a study of 2763 employment arbitration cases administered by the American Arbitra-
tion Association from 2003 to 2006, that employees were represented in 74.9% of the cas-
es); Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment 
Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 777, 792, 820 (2003) (examining 200 awards randomly selected from AAA 
Employment Arbitration Dispute awards initiated during 1999 and 2000 and finding that 
two-thirds of complainants arbitrating pursuant to promulgated cases were represented by 
attorneys).  Of course, it may also be that many other persons were deterred from arbitrating 
employment disputes by the fact that they could not obtain attorney representation. 
 25. For a good discussion of international commercial arbitration, see YVES DEZALAY & 
BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996). 
 26. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Landis, No. 30 190 00847 06 (Sept. 20, 2007) (Brunet, 
Arb., McLaren, Arb., & Campbell, Arb.), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/ 
active/arbitration_rulings/Landis%20Final%20(20-09-07)%20(3).pdf (reflecting that both 
sides were well represented by attorneys during the American arbitration hearing). 
 27. Readers may recall that the class action legal dispute over toxic chemicals, portrayed 
in the movie Erin Brockovich (Universal Studios, 2000), was ultimately taken to binding 
arbitration upon the agreement of counsel on both sides. 
STERNLIGHT CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:51 PM 
2010] LAWYERLESS DISPUTE RESOLUTION 389 
the results of arbitration or mediation, or should we also look at other 
things, such as disputants’ perceptions as to whether they were treated fair-
ly and justly?  Should we consider broader societal definitions of justice, as 
well as disputants’ own views?28  For purposes of this Article, I will focus 
primarily on the narrow question of what relief was obtained or paid by 
disputants, while recognizing the limits of this analysis. 
Second, as we look at degrees of success in mediation and arbitration for 
persons who do and do not have attorneys, how can we accurately compare 
them?  There is a significant apples and oranges problem.  If one learned, 
for example, that represented plaintiffs in a certain set of arbitrations won 
more frequently or won greater sums of money than unrepresented plain-
tiffs in arbitration, what would it mean?  Would it mean that the attorney’s 
skills enabled the plaintiff to do substantially better?  Or, would it mean 
that plaintiffs are more successful in obtaining attorneys in cases that have 
a greater likelihood of substantial success?29  That is, perhaps attorneys are 
good at screening cases but do not actually add value at all.30  How can 
these two explanations be distinguished?31 
Other problems exist as well.  For example, the impact of representation 
likely varies substantially depending on whether both parties are 
represented, or only one party is represented by an attorney.  Finally, as 
noted earlier, ADR processes vary substantially from one another.  Media-
tion and arbitration are very different from one another, and also vary tre-
mendously themselves.  Thus, a conclusion that attorneys do or do not mat-
ter in one particular context may well not be generalizable to other 
contexts. 
With all these significant caveats in mind, let us at least summarize the 
research that does exist.  First, very few studies focus on objective meas-
 
 28. I explore these philosophical sorts of issues in several prior works, including Jean R. 
Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005), and 
Jean R. Sternlight, ADR is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where it Fits in a System of 
Justice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289 (2003).  See also Engler, supra note 1, at 52 (stating that “[c]ase 
outcomes are not the sole, valid evaluative measure for assessment,” and that other meas-
ures may include “achieving customer satisfaction, easing strains on the court, and increas-
ing litigants’ understanding of court processes”). 
 29. See Colvin, supra note 24, at 433 (observing that because employees appear to do 
better in litigation than in arbitration, “[t]his disparity in the anticipated outcomes between 
the systems is likely to reduce substantially the willingness and ability of plaintiff’s counsel 
to represent employees in arbitration under contingency fee arrangements compared to liti-
gation”). 
 30. Id. (suggesting that differences in success of represented versus unrepresented em-
ployees in arbitration may be attributable in part to attorneys’ superior screening skills). 
 31. Theoretically the solution to this quandary is to assign or not assign attorneys to dis-
putes on a random basis, but accomplishing this end in the real world is difficult. 
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ures of the results of attorney representation, rather than on disputants’ per-
ceptions of the differences attorneys may or may not make.32  While such 
perception studies are interesting, they are mixed as to the importance of 
attorney representation.33  And, of course, unrepresented disputants are not 
in a good position to know what difference an attorney might have made. 
Second, those few studies looking at whether attorney representation af-
fects the likelihood of settlement or the amount of settlement in mediation 
tentatively seem to show34 that attorneys encourage claimants to settle less 
often35 but recover more when they do settle.  Specifically, one study 
showed that represented claimants obtained higher dollar settlements in 
mediation.36  As Roselle Wissler notes, however, this is but a single study 
and such differences may reflect selection factors, such as attorneys’ prefe-
rence for monetary as opposed to non-monetary awards, and disputants’ 
greater ability to obtain contingent-fee representation in higher dollar dis-
putes.37 
In arbitration, very few relevant studies have been done.  Those few 
conducted, however, tentatively show higher win rates and recoveries for 
persons who are represented.  For example, Alexander Colvin, looking at 
employment arbitration, found statistically significant differences in both 
win rates and recovery amounts depending on whether employees were 
represented.38  Along the same lines, empirical studies in the United King-
 
 32. See Wissler, supra note 13, at 435-41 (summarizing studies on the difference attor-
ney representation makes in mediation and concluding that most studies “found no differ-
ences between represented and unrepresented parties in their assessments of the fairness of 
the mediation process”). 
 33. See id. at 468; see also Peter J. Kuriloff, Is Mediation a Fair Way to Resolve Special 
Education Disputes? First Empirical Findings, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 35, 46, 54-57 
(1997) (finding that parents with an advocate, including both attorney and non-attorney, did 
not find mediation more or less satisfying than parents without, but, among parents who 
reached settlements, those with attorney advocates found the process fairer than those with 
non-attorney advocates or no representation, and also found the implementation of the 
agreement to be more satisfactory). 
 34. Wissler, supra note 13, at 458. 
 35. See id. at 459 (finding that across studies, full settlement was most likely when law-
yers were not present in mediation, but that in some studies partial settlement was highest 
when lawyers were present). 
 36. See E. Patrick McDermott & Ruth Obar, “What’s Going On” in Mediation: An Em-
pirical Analysis of the Influence of a Mediator’s Style on Party Satisfaction and Monetary 
Benefit, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 75, 102-03, 107 (finding that represented claimants re-
ceived higher monetary awards in EEO mediation, but failing to distinguish between lawyer 
and non-lawyer representatives). 
 37. Wissler, supra note 13, at 466-68. 
 38. Colvin, supra note 24, at 433 (finding that represented employees won 22.6% of the 
time as compared to 13.7% for unrepresented employees, and that the mean damage award 
for represented employees was $28,009 as compared to $13,222 for self-represented em-
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dom generally suggest that represented tribunal applicants are more likely 
to achieve favorable outcomes than unrepresented applicants.39 
C. Distinguishing Legal and Non-Legal Representation 
Given that few studies attempt to examine the impact of attorneys on ob-
jective success in mediation and arbitration, it is not surprising that we also 
have little information comparing the relative success of attorneys and non-
attorneys.  One study suggests that disputants may sometimes be more sa-
tisfied with representation by non-lawyers (e.g. union representatives) than 
lawyers, and that lawyers may not settle as many cases completely as may 
non-lawyers.40  Of course, it is likely also true that the specialized expertise 
of the representative can be extremely important for both attorney and non-
attorney representatives.41 
II.  WHY MIGHT ATTORNEYS BE NEEDED IN ADR? 
Some might suggest that one of the goals of ADR is to avoid the need 
for attorneys.  One of the virtues of a purportedly simpler, less adversarial 
dispute resolution process would seem to be that disputants would be fully 
capable of representing themselves, and not have to rely on expensive at-
torneys. 
In addition, some may have a sense that the typically adversarial mindset 
of attorneys does not fit with less adversarial ADR processes.  The point is 
worth considering.  Studies have shown that the kinds of people who typi-
cally enter and graduate from law school are often psychologically ill-
 
ployees); see also Richard N. Block & Jack Stieber, The Impact of Attorneys and Arbitra-
tors on Arbitration Awards, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 543, 552-54 (1987) (finding that 
parties in labor arbitration received more favorable outcomes when they had counsel and 
their opponent did not, but when both parties lacked counsel, outcomes resembled those in 
which both parties were represented).  But cf. Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An 
Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration 
Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 777, 792, 820 (2003) (looking at 200 awards 
randomly selected from AAA Employment Arbitration Dispute awards initiated during 1999 
and 2000 and finding win/loss ratios indistinguishable between persons who arbitrated with 
attorney representation and persons who arbitrated pro se). 
 39. Hazel Genn, Tribunals and Informal Justice, 56 MOD. L. REV. 396, 398 (1993). 
 40. Bingham et al., supra note 22, at 364-71. 
 41. HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK 
77, 111-49 (1998) (finding, in study of social security disability appeals, that claimants 
represented by nonattorneys did much better than unrepresented claimants, but not as well 
as claimants represented by attorneys, and that “formal training (in the law) is less crucial 
than is day-to-day experience in the unemployment compensation setting”); see also Engler, 
supra note 1, at 3, 47-48 (noting importance of not just any advocate, but an advocate with 
specialized expertise). 
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suited to consider non-legal interests and non-adversarial solutions.42  The 
fear is, lawyers will not prove helpful in ADR and may just mess it up.43  
Specifically, attorneys in mediation may focus unduly on narrow monetary 
interests, may be overly argumentative, or may discourage their clients 
from addressing opposing disputants directly.44  Similarly, attorneys have 
been criticized for turning arbitration, which often used to be a quick, sim-
ple process, into just another type of litigation.45  Some jurisdictions have 
gone so far as to prohibit attorneys from participating in certain categories 
of court-connected mediation.46  A few commentators have urged that tra-
ditional adversarial lawyers should not play a role in mediation.47 
Yet, particularly as ADR has become mandatory in many contexts in 
many jurisdictions, the question of whether individuals can effectively 
represent themselves has become more pressing.  When ADR is voluntary, 
some may assume that a disputant would not choose to go to ADR unrepre-
sented if she did not think that it served her best interest.48  When people 
are being forced into ADR we can no longer assume that it is a process they 
have chosen or want.  Also, it is quite possible, particularly in mandatory 
ADR, that one side may be represented while the other is not.  Even those 
 
 42. See generally Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: “The 
Problem” in Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 903-04 (2008) 
(“[L]awyers—even those who have been trained in and appreciate interest-based negotia-
tion—tend to employ their habitual lens,” thereby viewing problems more narrowly and le-
galistically than many clients or mediators); Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 
OHIO ST. L.J. 29 (1982); see also Chris Guthrie, The Lawyer’s Philosophical Map and the 
Disputant’s Perceptual Map: Impediments to Facilitative Mediation and Lawyering, 6 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 145 (2001). 
 43. See, e.g., Kuriloff, supra note 33, at 54 (“[I]t is arguable that their training as ‘zeal-
ous advocates’ in an adversarial system may hamper communication and cooperation in a 
mediation.” (citing CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS 146 (2d ed. 1996))). 
 44. I discuss some of these problems in Sternlight, supra note 3. 
 45. For discussions of the evolution of arbitration, see Brunet, supra note 23, and Stipa-
nowich, supra note 23. 
 46. Roselle Wissler and Stephan Landsman each note several of these jurisdictions.  
Stephan Landsman, Nothing for Something?  Denying Access to Legal Assistance to Those 
Compelled to Participate in ADR Proceedings, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 273, 290 (2010); 
Wissler, supra note 13, at 428. 
 47. E.g., Mark C. Rutherford, Lawyers and Divorce Mediation: Designing the Role of 
“Outside Counsel”, MEDIATION Q., June 1986, at 17 (urging a new role for lawyers in di-
vorce mediation, such that a single attorney would neutrally advise all disputants). 
 48. Of course, this assumption is not necessarily valid, in that taking a dispute to ADR 
without representation, even when voluntary, may simply be the lesser of evils rather than 
something that the disputant actually wants.  For example, a disputant who cannot obtain an 
attorney may prefer to be unrepresented in mediation, rather than in litigation.  Yet, that 
does not mean that the disputant’s choice of unrepresented mediation is something the dis-
putant actually sees in a positive light. 
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who might prefer lawyerless dispute resolution may be concerned about a 
process in which only one side receives representation. 
Moreover, upon reflection most people would probably agree that law-
yers, at least potentially, can be extremely helpful in ADR proceedings.  
We all know that lawyers are trained to make legal arguments.  While some 
may believe that such arguments have no place or no proper place in ADR 
proceedings, it turns out that, in fact, legal arguments often do play a role in 
both mediation and arbitration.  In addition, lawyers can also help their 
clients in many ways other than making legal arguments. 
The discussion which follows first examines the Supreme Court’s ex-
pressed perspective on why clients may need attorneys, next looks at some 
social science research adding an additional perspective on how lawyers 
can be helpful, thirdly focuses on how attorneys may specifically help 
clients in ADR, next considers whether adding attorneys to ADR processes 
is likely to harm those processes, and finally asks whether non-attorney 
representatives are likely to prove as helpful as attorneys in ADR. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Perspective on Clients’ Need for Lawyers 
The Supreme Court has been asked, in numerous contexts, to determine 
clients’ need for legal representation.49  For the purpose of this analysis, the 
bottom-line results of these cases are less important than the reasoning the 
Court has employed to reach its decisions.  This Article is not arguing for a 
constitutional right to counsel in ADR processes, but rather examining the 
assumptions underlying the Court’s right to counsel decisions.  As for the 
results of the Courts’ decisions, suffice it to say that these decisions have 
been nuanced.  The Court has sometimes mandated appointment of coun-
sel,50 sometimes left appointment of counsel to the discretion of the trial 
court,51 and sometimes found appointment of counsel to be unnecessary.52 
 
 49. Often the Court has addressed whether various clauses of the Constitution require 
that legal counsel be appointed for persons who cannot afford to hire their own attorney.  
Sometimes the Court has addressed whether statutory prohibitions or limitations on right to 
counsel are justifiable. 
 50. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1962) (holding that indigent 
criminal defendants accused of felonies are entitled under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to have counsel appointed for them, and rejecting prior case-by-case analysis 
of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)). 
 51. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding that under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an indigent parent threatened with ter-
mination of parental rights may or may not be entitled to appointment of counsel, depending 
upon the complexity of the issues and the relative competence of the parent to present those 
issues); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (holding that a probationer threat-
ened with revocation of his probation may or may not be constitutionally entitled to counsel, 
depending upon the specific factual circumstances). 
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Although the Court’s decisions on the right to counsel tend to be very 
fact specific, they also depend on a theory, never explained in depth, as to 
when it is most important for clients to have legal representation.  The 
Court has typically found that the need for attorney representation is great-
est when: (1) the client has something very important at stake;53 (2) the 
client’s participation in legal proceedings is involuntary;54 (3) the hearing is 
formal and adversarial in nature; and (4) the client has shown that he or she 
may lack sufficient expertise or competence to adequately represent her 
own interests.  These factors, particularly the third and fourth factors, are 
implicitly founded on a “knowledge and skills” model of lawyering.  In 
particular, the Court apparently believes that lawyers’ greatest contribution 
to their clients are such knowledge and skills as ability to research and 
present the law, ability to gather and present facts, and ability to cross-
examine opposing witnesses.  Given the Court’s emphasis on these skills it 
is understandable why the Court believes attorneys are needed more in 
formal and adversarial settings as compared to less formal and less adver-
sarial fora.  After the following section examines the Court’s assumption 
that lawyers are most needed for their knowledge and skills, and the related 
assertion that lawyers are more needed in adversarial than non-adversarial 
proceedings, Part II.B will then raise some questions as to whether lawyers’ 
knowledge and skills are in fact their greatest contribution to clients. 
1. Lawyers Are Most Needed for Their Skills and Expertise 
Both explicitly and implicitly, the Supreme Court has frequently identi-
fied the sorts of tasks it believes most require the assistance of counsel, 
such as gathering and presenting facts, conducting legal analyses, and using 
procedural skills such as cross-examination.55  For example, in Gideon v. 
 
 52. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (holding that the state was not re-
quired to appoint counsel for a person accused of theft and ultimately fined but not impri-
soned). 
 53. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that absent a 
knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, no matter 
how classified, unless he was represented by counsel at trial); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339 (ap-
pointment of counsel for indigent is mandatory where indigent is accused of committing a 
felony). 
 54. Compare Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335 (indigent criminal defendant accused of felony 
must be afforded counsel) and Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 18 (1981) (indigent threatened with 
termination of parental rights may be entitled to counsel, depending on factual circums-
tances) with Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (veterans 
seeking service-connected benefits are not denied constitutional rights by statute which pre-
vents them from paying attorney more than ten dollars as a maximum fee). 
 55. Occasionally, the Court mentions other important functions of counsel.  See, e.g., 
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 34 (noting that attorneys can be important in criminal cases to aid 
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Wainwright,56 discussing the right to counsel in criminal cases, the Court 
famously quoted Justice Sutherland’s words in Powell v. Alabama:57 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not 
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.  Even the intelligent and 
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.  
If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for him-
self whether the indictment is good or bad.  He is unfamiliar with the rules 
of evidence.  Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial, with-
out a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evi-
dence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.  He lacks both the 
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he 
have a perfect one [sic].58 
On the civil side, Goldberg v. Kelly explained that “[c]ounsel can help 
delineate the issues, present the factual contentions in an orderly manner, 
conduct cross-examination, and generally safeguard the interests of the re-
cipient.”59 
2. Need for Attorney is Greatest When Clients Lack Legal Skills and 
Knowledge 
The Court has consistently stated that clients who are more skilled in the 
law, better able to investigate and present facts, and generally more articu-
late need attorneys less than those clients who lack these same traits.  For 
 
defendants in negotiating plea agreements, so that defendants know what they are doing, are 
aware of their alternatives, and are treated fairly by the prosecution). 
 56. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 57. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 58. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69).  Similarly, discuss-
ing the possible need for an attorney in the context of a parole revocation the Court ex-
plained that: 
[T]he effectiveness of [certain Due Process] rights . . . may in some circumstances 
depend on the use of skills which the probationer or parolee is unlikely to possess.  
Despite the informal nature of the proceedings and the absence of technical rules 
of procedure or evidence, the unskilled or uneducated probationer or parolee may 
well have difficulty in presenting his version of a disputed set of facts where the 
presentation requires the examining or cross-examining of witnesses or the offer-
ing or dissecting of complex documentary evidence. 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786-87 (1973) (holding that attorneys must sometimes, 
but not always, be provided to persons facing revocation of parole). 
 59. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970) (holding that welfare recipient is 
entitled to retain counsel to contest termination of benefits).  In re Gault similarly states: 
“The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled 
inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether 
he has a defense and to prepare and submit it.”  387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (holding that a juve-
nile threatened with commitment as a juvenile delinquent has a right to retain counsel or, if 
he cannot afford counsel, to have an attorney appointed for him). 
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example, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,60 the Court noted that “the unskilled or 
uneducated probationer or parolee may well have difficulty in presenting 
his version of a disputed set of facts where the presentation requires the ex-
amining or cross-examining of witnesses or the offering or dissecting of 
complex documentary evidence.”61  Illiteracy is one marker of those clients 
who may most need assistance from an attorney.62 
3. Need for Attorney is Greatest When the Proceeding is Formal and 
Adversarial 
At the same time, even those clients who lack skills will not always be 
held to require the assistance of an attorney, because the Court looks not 
only at the clients’ skills (or lack thereof) but also at the nature of the pro-
ceeding itself.63  In particular, numerous Supreme Court decisions have 
stated that persons have a greater need for representation when proceedings 
are formal and adversarial in nature than when proceedings are informal.  
The Court has expressed this philosophy in the most detail in Walters v. 
National Association of Radiation Survivors,64 a decision refusing to find 
unconstitutional a statutory provision preventing veterans from paying their 
attorneys more than ten dollars in suits seeking veterans’ disability bene-
 
 60. 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (holding that some but not all probationers are entitled to ap-
pointment of counsel in revocation hearings). 
 61. Id. at 787. 
 62. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974) (suggesting that illiterate inmates 
need more help in contesting disciplinary proceedings than those who can read, and there-
fore found they could be entitled to help from a fellow inmate or other helper, if not an at-
torney).  In the converse situation, Betts v. Brady, a pre-Gideon case, held that criminal de-
fendants were only entitled to counsel on a case-by-case basis, and found the Due Process 
Clause was not violated by denying Mr. Betts counsel where he was a forty-three year old 
man “of ordinary intelligence, and ability to take care of his own interests on the trial of that 
narrow issue.” 316 U.S. 455, 472 (1942).  Mr. Betts “had once before been in a criminal 
court, pleaded guilty to larceny and served a sentence and was not wholly unfamiliar with 
criminal procedure.”  Id. 
 63. In Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, the majority held that an indigent mother was 
not entitled to counsel in a hearing to terminate her parental rights, even though the Depart-
ment of Social Services did have counsel, in part because “no expert witnesses testified, and 
the case presented no specially troublesome points of law . . . .”  452 U.S. 18, 32 (1981).  
The Court further found that Ms. Lassiter’s arguments were so weak that “the presence of 
counsel for Ms. Lassiter could not have made a determinative difference.”  Id. at 32-33.  In 
contrast, the dissenters would have afforded counsel to Ms. Lassiter.  Id. at 35, 59-60.  They 
stated: “a parent acting pro se is . . . likely to be unaware of controlling legal standards and 
practices, and unskilled in garnering relevant facts . . . .”  Id. at 51.  Alluding to additional 
factors, going beyond mere knowledge and skills, the dissenters also asserted: “When the 
parent is indigent, lacking in education, and easily intimidated by figures of authority, the 
imbalance [of power] may well become insuperable.”  Id. at 46. 
 64. 473 U.S. 305 (1985). 
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fits.65  Rejecting constitutional arguments asserting a right to pay more than 
ten dollars for representation, the Court stated: “Simple factual questions 
are capable of resolution in a nonadversarial context, and it is less than 
crystal clear why lawyers must be available to identify possible errors in 
medical judgment.”66  Distinguishing prior precedent that provided a right 
to counsel in adversarial criminal proceedings, the Court stated: 
[T]he process here is not designed to operate adversarially.67  While 
counsel may well be needed to respond to opposing counsel or other 
forms of adversary in a trial-type proceeding, where as here no such ad-
versary appears, and in addition a claimant or recipient is provided with 
substitute safeguards such as a competent representative, a decisionmaker 
whose duty it is to aid the claimant, and significant concessions with re-
spect to the claimant’s burden of proof, the need for counsel is considera-
bly diminished.  We have expressed similar concerns in other cases hold-
ing that counsel is not required in various proceedings that do not 
approximate trials, but instead are more informal and nonadversary.68 
As noted in Walters, the Court had previously held that not all important 
decisions need be made in an adversarial context or with the assistance of 
an attorney.69 
 
 65. Id. at 332. 
 66. Id. at 330.  In Walters, the Court considered evidence regarding the types of cases 
presented to the Veterans’ Administration and regarding success rates in cases depending 
upon the representation, if any, secured by the veteran.  The Court noted that veterans 
represented by attorneys were only slightly more successful than veterans represented by a 
non-attorney or even veterans who were entirely unrepresented.  Id. at 327 (finding that vet-
erans with attorneys prevailed 18.3% of the time in appeals to the Board of Veterans Ap-
peals and that persons who were unrepresented prevailed 15.2% of the time). 
 67. Id. at 333.  The Court asserted that although the Veterans’ Administration may have 
been opposing a veteran’s claim in a particular matter, the governmental body was not an 
adversary inherently opposed to the interests of the claimant.  Id. at 310. 
 68. Id. at 333-34 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608-09 (1979)); see Goss v. Lo-
pez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974).  The Wal-
ters Court further explained that precedents requiring lawyers in adversarial criminal mat-
ters or stating that counsel can help identify legal questions and present arguments are of 
tangential relevance in non-adversarial procedures.  473 U.S. at 332. 
 69. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 606-13 (holding that the decision to admit a minor to a 
mental institution, with the permission of his or her parents, must be made following an in-
quiry by an independent neutral, but that the neutral need not be law-trained and that the in-
quiry need not be adversarial); Goss, 419 U.S. at 740-41 (finding that while students threat-
ened with short suspensions are entitled to certain procedural protections, they do not have 
the right to secure counsel, to confront or cross-examine witnesses, or to call their own wit-
nesses, observing that so formalizing the process would be undesirable); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 
569-70 (finding that prisoners challenging loss of their good-time credits were not entitled 
to either retained or appointed counsel, in part because the prison disciplinary hearing was 
not particularly adversarial); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790-91 (1973) (finding that 
persons at risk for revocation of their probation were not necessarily entitled to appointed 
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At the same time, the Court has occasionally recognized that even in cer-
tain purportedly informal proceedings, such as parole revocations, lawyers’ 
skills may be critically important if the hearing has an adversarial nature. 
Despite the informal nature of the proceedings and the absence of tech-
nical rules of procedure or evidence, the unskilled or uneducated proba-
tioner or parolee may well have difficulty in presenting his version of a 
disputed set of facts where the presentation requires the examining or 
cross-examining of witnesses or the offering or dissecting of complex do-
cumentary evidence.70 
4. Fear that Injecting Counsel into Non-adversarial Process will 
Undermine That Process 
In discussing the need for appointing counsel or allowing counsel in 
non-adversarial or less-adversarial proceedings, the Court has repeatedly 
expressed concern that allowing participation of counsel may somehow 
impede the value of such process.  In Walters, refusing to find unconstitu-
tional a statute prohibiting veterans from paying attorneys more than ten 
dollars to help them pursue benefit claims, the Court explained that: 
A necessary concomitant of Congress’ desire that a veteran not need a 
representative to assist him in making his claim was that the system 
should be as informal and nonadversarial as possible.  This is not to say 
that complicated factual inquiries may be rendered simple by the expe-
 
counsel, given that probation revocation hearings are less formal and less adversarial than 
criminal trials).  The Gagnon Court stated: 
In a criminal trial, the State is represented by a prosecutor; formal rules of evi-
dence are in force; a defendant enjoys a number of procedural rights which may 
be lost if not timely raised; and, in a jury trial, a defendant must make a presenta-
tion understandable to untrained jurors.  In short, a criminal trial under our system 
is an adversary proceeding with its own unique characteristics. In a revocation 
hearing, on the other hand, the State is represented, not by a prosecutor, but by a 
parole officer with the orientation described above [trying to help the probation-
er]; formal procedures and rules of evidence are not employed; and the members 
of the hearing body are familiar with the problems and practice of probation or pa-
role. 
Id. at 789.  Instead, the Court found counsel should be provided on a case-by-case basis, de-
pending on the arguments being made by the probationer and the degree to which the proba-
tioner seems “capable of speaking effectively for himself.”  Id. at 791.  See also Vitek v. 
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 500 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (finding that a prisoner threatened 
with transfer to a mental health facility may need assistance, but in the context of this more 
informal setting the assistance need not be provided by an attorney rather than a mental 
health professional); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44-46 (1972) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (suggesting that whereas indigent criminal defendants have a right to counsel in a 
jury trial if they may be deprived of liberty, in contrast, counsel may not be needed “in a 
nonjury trial before a judge experienced in piecing together unassembled facts”). 
 70. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786-87. 
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dient of informality, but surely Congress desired that the proceedings be 
as informal and nonadversarial as possible.  The regular introduction of 
lawyers into the proceedings would be quite unlikely to further this 
goal.71 
Quoting extensively from Henry Friendly’s famous article, Some Kind of 
Hearing,72 the Court urged that allowing the participation of compensated 
attorneys would make the Veterans’ Administration (“VA”) hearings more 
adversarial and more complex, and thereby necessitate the retention of at-
torneys for claims currently simple enough to be pursued by veterans with-
out the assistance of counsel.73 
Similarly in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, holding that criminals defending 
against parole revocation should be allowed appointed counsel on a case-
by-case basis, the Court announced that: 
The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding will alter signif-
icantly the nature of the proceeding.  If counsel is provided for the proba-
tioner or parolee, the State in turn will normally provide its own counsel; 
lawyers, by training and disposition, are advocates and bound by profes-
sional duty to present all available evidence and arguments in support of 
their clients’ positions and to contest with vigor all adverse evidence and 
views.  The role of the hearing body itself, aptly described in Morrissey as 
being ‘predictive and discretionary’ as well as factfinding, may become 
more akin to that of a judge at a trial, and less attuned to the rehabilitative 
needs of the individual probationer or parolee. . . . Certainly, the deci-
sionmaking process will be prolonged, and the financial cost to the 
State—for appointed counsel, counsel for the State, a longer record, and 
the possibility of judicial review—will not be insubstantial.74 
 
 71. Walters, 473 U.S. at 323-24. 
 72. Id. at 325-26 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 
1267 (1975)); see also Genn, supra note 39, at 399 (noting that British policymakers have 
expressed reluctance to encourage legal representation in informal tribunals for fear that 
lawyers might undermine speed and informality of those processes). 
 73. Walters, 473 U.S. at 326.  Cf. Goss, 419 U.S. at 583 (“[F]urther formalizing the sus-
pension process and escalating its formality and adversary nature may not only make it too 
costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching 
process.”). 
 74. 411 U.S. at 787-88.  The Court also opined that providing counsel may actually 
harm the defendant because “[i]n the greater self-consciousness of its quasi-judicial role, the 
hearing body may be less tolerant of marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure to 
reincarcerate than to continue nonpunitive rehabilitation.”  Id. at 788.  The Court expressed 
some similar concerns in Wolff, a case holding that prisoners have no right to retained or 
appointed counsel to represent them in disciplinary hearings.  418 U.S. at 570.  The Court 
explained: 
[t]he insertion of counsel into the disciplinary process would inevitably give the 
proceedings a more adversary cast and tend to reduce their utility as a means to 
further correctional goals.  There would also be delay and very practical problems 
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5. Others Share the Supreme Court’s Views on When Clients Most Need 
Attorneys 
The Supreme Court is not alone in its assumptions that lawyers are most 
needed for their skill and expertise and that the need for lawyers is greater 
in adversarial than in non-adversarial proceedings.  The European Court of 
Human Rights has stated that 
[t]he question whether the provision of legal aid is necessary for a fair 
hearing must be determined on the basis of the particular facts and cir-
cumstances of each case and will depend, inter alia, upon the importance 
of what is at stake for the applicant in the proceedings, the complexity of 
the relevant law and procedure and the applicant’s capacity to represent 
him or herself effectively.75 
Commentator Hazel Genn has noted that when the British set up informal 
tribunals to take the place of courts “there was an assumption that the in-
formality of proceedings would make it possible for applicants to represent 
themselves at hearings.”76 
The approach taken by the American Bar Association (“ABA”) to the 
right to counsel is perhaps a bit more nuanced.  In a 2006 Resolution, the 
ABA called on state governments and the federal government to provide 
right to counsel “in those categories of adversarial proceedings where ba-
sic human needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, 
safety, health or child custody.”77  This statement, and the accompanying 
report, specifically distinguish adversarial from non-adversarial matters, 
 
in providing counsel in sufficient numbers at the time and place where hearings 
are to be held. 
Id. at 570. 
 75. Steel v. United Kingdom, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 22.61 (2005) (holding that two Green 
Peace advocates should have been afforded counsel to defend themselves in a defamation 
action).  The European Court of Human Rights found that the two activists, a “part-time bar 
worker” and “an unwaged single parent,” id. at 50, albeit “articulate and resourceful,” id. at 
68, were not sufficiently capable to handle a case involving about 40,000 pages of documen-
tary evidence and 130 oral witnesses, as well as a 313 day trial and 23 day appeal, id. at 49, 
72.  See also Airey v. Ireland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 305 (1979) (holding that an indigent woman 
of “humble family background” was entitled to legal assistance in her action to secure a le-
gal separation from her husband because litigation of this kind involves complicated law 
and facts, may well require expert evidence, and also may “entail an emotional involvement 
that is scarcely compatible with the degree of objectivity required by advocacy in court”). 
 76. Genn, supra note 39, at 395. 
 77. ABA Resolution 112A (Aug. 7, 2006), at 1 (emphasis added) (delineating tasks), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A112A.pdf.  This 
Resolution was supported by a report entitled ABA Task Force on Access to Civil Justice et 
al., Report to the House of Delegates.  But note that another ABA Resolution, 112B (Aug. 7, 
2006), passed the same day, stated that a full range of legal aid services should include “re-
presentation in negotiation and alternative dispute resolution.”  Id. at 2. 
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urging that attorneys are needed more in the adversarial than non-
adversarial context.78  Yet, in a separate report, discussing principles for 
delivering civil legal aid, the ABA recommended that an attempt be made 
to afford “representation in negotiation and alternative dispute resolu-
tion.”79  It seems that the ABA has not focused much attention on the ques-
tion of whether attorneys might be important in arbitration or mediation. 
B. Lawyers’ Contributions Beyond Knowledge and Skills 
The Supreme Court and others’ perspective that lawyers’ primary con-
tribution is their knowledge and skills, no doubt seem intuitively obvious to 
many.  Upon reflection, however, it is not obvious, at least to this author, 
that the Court has correctly identified all of the ways lawyers are helpful to 
their clients. 
Sociologist Rebecca Sandefur has conducted a major study yielding in-
triguing results regarding the importance of legal representation.80  Her me-
ta-analysis examining 74,000 cases reported in seventeen studies finds that 
the importance of legal representation, relative to both self-representation 
and representation by non-lawyers, appears to vary tremendously.  Depend-
ing on the study and on the statistical assumptions employed, lawyers’ im-
pact ranged from non-existent to making it thirty-eight times more likely 
that plaintiffs would prevail.81 
Sandefur’s most fascinating result, at least for this author, is that law-
yers’ impact relative to self-representation appears to be greatest not in the 
 
 78. The report states that: 
[t]he right defined in this resolution focuses on representation in adversarial pro-
ceedings; it does not propose a generalized right to legal advice or to legal assis-
tance unrelated to litigation in such forums.  “Adversarial proceedings” as defined 
in the resolution are intended to include both judicial and some quasi-judicial tri-
bunals, because many of the disputes involving the basic human needs described 
below are, in one jurisdiction or another, allocated to administrative agencies or 
tribunals. 
Id. at 13. 
 79. ABA Task Force on Access to Civil Justice et al., Principles of a State System for 
the Delivery of Civil Legal Aid (Aug. 7, 2006), at 1.  Interestingly, this second report sup-
ported a resolution adopted by the ABA House of Delegates on the same day as the first re-
port, noted supra note 77.  Apparently, the ABA has not focused much attention on the 
possible need for legal representation in ADR proceedings. 
 80. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Expertise: Lawyers’ Impact on Civil Trial and 
Hearing Outcomes (Mar. 26, 2008) (on file with author).  After starting with “every known 
published quantitative analysis of the relationship between attorney representation and civil 
trial or hearing outcomes,” which amounted to fewer than forty studies over the course of 
four decades, Sandefur then used a variety of criteria to limit her focus to seventeen studies.  
Id. at 9-10. 
 81. Id. at 25. 
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most complex disputes, but rather in those cases that are simpler either pro-
cedurally82 or substantively.83  That is, whereas researchers, in addition to 
the Supreme Court, have tended to assume that lawyers’ knowledge of 
substantive law and procedure is their most important contribution to their 
clients, Sandefur’s study showed that, in fact, such expertise was actually 
inversely correlated to lawyers’ superior performance relative to self-
representation.  Lawyers were 2.3 times more successful than unrepre-
sented parties in cases that were above average in substantive complexity 
but 9 times more successful than unrepresented parties in cases that were 
below average in substantive complexity.84  Similarly, attorneys were 6.16 
times more successful than unrepresented parties in cases of average pro-
cedural complexity but 9.23 times as successful in cases of below average 
substantive complexity.85 
The comparison of lawyers to non-lawyer advocates (“NLAs”), rather 
than to unrepresented clients, yielded a quite different set of results.  San-
defur found that lawyers outperformed NLAs more (though not always sig-
nificantly) in those cases that were  procedurally or substantively complex, 
as compared to cases that were simple.86 
What might explain Sandefur’s results?  Why would it be more impor-
tant to be represented in a simpler case than a more complex case?  And, 
 
 82. Sandefur defines procedural complexity by looking to surveys of lawyer-
practitioners in the various fields of law.  Id. at 12-13 (citing 1995 Chicago Lawyers Sur-
vey). 
 83. Sandefur defines substantive complexity by looking to “a group of experts—
professors of law at Northwestern University Law School and American Bar Foundation 
research specialists on the legal profession.”  Id. at 11-12.  Of course, these experts’ charac-
terizations may themselves be flawed.  They may, for example, be based on a false concep-
tion that matters of lesser value are necessarily simpler.  See Genn, supra note 39, at 400.  
Also, the apparent simplicity of certain matters may cause unrepresented disputants to omit 
legal arguments that were in fact necessary.  Id. at 403. 
 84. Sandefur, supra note 80, at 25-27.  These numbers assume exogeneity, meaning that 
the lawyers’ presence is unrelated to the case’s likelihood of success.  Id.  The figures pro-
vided show differences across the seventeen studies, i.e. weighting for the differences in 
numbers of cases counted in each study.  Id.  The differences between simpler and more 
complex cases were even greater comparing differences across cases, rather than across stu-
dies.  Id. 
 85. Id. at 27.  These numbers again assume exogeneity and show differences across the 
seventeen studies.  The differences were even greater comparing differences across cases, 
rather than across studies. 
 86. Under all statistical assumptions, lawyers mattered more than NLAs in cases that 
were more procedurally complex.  Id. at 27-28.  Depending on statistical assumptions, law-
yers outperformed NLAs either for the most complex cases, or for the cases of average 
complexity.  Note that Sandefur also attempts to discern whether lawyers’ impact is greater 
in more formal trials than in more simplified tribunals and small claims courts.  Her results, 
however, are ambiguous, depending on exogeneity assumptions.  Id. at 28-29. 
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why might lawyers outperform NLAs in more complex cases as compared 
to simpler cases?  To resolve this puzzle it may help to consider what kinds 
of cases are said to be relatively simple.  Sandefur states that “[t]he studies 
in which we observe the largest differences in the outcomes of lawyer-
represented and self-represented cases include landlord-tenant cases, asy-
lum cases, and social security disability reconsideration hearings.”87  San-
defur observes that “[i]n these disputes, the focal party frequently labors 
under the double stigmas of a disesteemed social position—poor person, 
immigrant—and a disesteemed legal position—cast as a delinquent tenant, 
illegal migrant, or malinger.”88  Sandefur goes on to opine that in these 
sorts of settings lawyers may benefit their clients by  providing a sort of 
endorsement that leads judges and court staff to treat them better and eva-
luate their cases as more likely meritorious.89  She further notes that in 
these settings, cases are often “treated perfunctorily or in an ad hoc fashion 
by judges, hearing officers and clerks.”90  She cites studies finding that 
judges in such settings may often “short cut the law.”91  Based on these 
theories, Sandefur opines that “lawyers’ impact appears greatest when low-
er status people appear in hearings where summary processing is standard 
operating procedure, or the court’s adherence to the law is ad hoc.  In these 
settings, lawyers appear to assist their clients, in part, by simply assisting 
the court in following its own rules.”92  Given that this function is non-
technical, Sandefur finds it understandable that NLAs could similarly pro-
vide substantial assistance to clients in such settings. 
Perhaps an even simpler explanation suffices.  The sorts of people who 
are often unrepresented in “simple” cases need help that is not based exclu-
sively on procedural and substantive expertise.  Erica Fox, in an article dis-
cussing unrepresented tenants’ ability to negotiate on their own behalf in 
Boston Housing Court, describes a concept she calls “self-agency.”93  “If 
negotiators authorize themselves to identify and to prioritize their interests, 
as well as to pursue and to satisfy them, [they are said to have] a high de-
gree of ‘self-agency.’”94  In contrast, when unrepresented persons can be 
knowledgeable and articulate in the hallway, and seem to have a strong le-
 
 87. Id. at 30. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 31. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 32-33. 
 93. Erica L. Fox, Alone in the Hallway: Challenges to Effective Self-Representation in 
Negotiation, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 85, 86-87 (1996). 
 94. Id. at 87. 
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gal position, but nonetheless reach a settlement that is lopsided in favor of 
the opposing party, Fox would say they lack “self-agency.”95 
Drawing on several months of observations and interviews at the Boston 
Housing Court, Fox found that tenants who were very verbal and able to 
talk on their own behalf in the hallway almost magically became silent 
when the time came to negotiate directly or in a mediation with the lan-
dlord’s attorney.  One tenant explained the phenomenon: “People here are 
afraid to talk.  You know, you get that inner fear, and you’re too afraid to 
say anything.”96  Alternatively, some clients engaged in what Fox calls 
“constructive silence,” whereby they spoke words that were audible but not 
significant.97  In short, the tenants typically felt and acted disempowered, 
and thereby could not and did not negotiate effectively on their own be-
half.98 
Putting together Fox’s individual study and Sandefur’s statistical work it 
is possible to begin to think about roles played by attorneys that do not de-
pend only on procedural and substantive expertise.  In ADR, as in litiga-
tion, attorneys can help empower clients to stand up for themselves, and to 
express their own perspectives.  Even in relatively simple disputes, where 
the procedural rules have been geared to allow access by pro se disputants, 
it seems obvious that many individuals will not feel entirely comfortable 
trying to represent their own interests.  Whether one calls this attorney role 
“boosting self-agency,” “providing emotional support,” or “balancing pow-
er,” it seems clear that attorneys potentially play important roles that go 
beyond providing legal expertise.99  Thus, in considering the need for re-
presentation in mediation and arbitration we should ask not only whether 
these processes are so complex or adversarial as to require representation, 
but also whether the participants in the ADR process would benefit from 
the sort of emotional or other support that representatives may provide. 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 98 (quoting a tenant named Arnold Moses). 
 97. Fox cites author Bell Hooks, who describes such constructive silence as “black 
women’s silence.”  Speaking of herself, Hooks writes, “I was never taught absolute silence, 
I was taught that it was important to speak but to talk a talk that was in itself a silence.”  Id. 
at 99 (quoting BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING BLACK 6 
(1989)). 
 98. On those relatively few occasions when tenants did try to assert themselves, they 
were sometimes punished for exercising such self-agency.  Id. at 105-06. 
 99. Many other commentators have, of course, focused on how lawyers can help make 
up for disputants’ lack of power or perceived power.  See, e.g., CENTER FOR AUTO SAFETY, 
LITTLE INJUSTICES: SMALL CLAIMS COURTS AND THE AMERICAN CONSUMER (1972); Engler, 
supra note 1. 
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C. How Lawyers Can Help in ADR 
Drawing upon both the traditional knowledge and skills typically em-
phasized by the Supreme Court, and the supportive emotional and other 
factors illustrated by the work of Sandefur and Fox, this Part will now ex-
plore when and how attorneys can be useful in mediation and arbitration.  
Of course, throughout this exercise it is essential to remember that arbitra-
tion and mediation are very different from one another, and that these 
processes themselves also vary tremendously, depending on the context.  
Nonetheless, we will see that there are many stages at which attorney par-
ticipation can be very useful in both arbitration and mediation.  In particu-
lar, lawyers add value through imparting their procedural and strategic 
knowledge regarding the various processes, gathering and presenting legal 
and factual information, assisting specifically in negotiation, and empower-
ing their clients.  Thus, even to the extent arbitration and mediation are rel-
atively simple and non-adversarial, which is often not the case, lawyers can 
provide a great deal of assistance with regard to these processes. 
1. Knowledge and Strategy re: Processes 
Lawyers can be very useful in helping disputants decide whether arbitra-
tion or mediation is desirable.  Although some lawyers will be more know-
ledgeable than others about the pros and cons of such processes, certainly 
they will generally know more than their clients.  Even when the processes 
are theoretically mandatory, lawyers may be able to help clients avoid 
processes that they believe would not be desirable.  Also, lawyers are better 
positioned than clients to decide whether to opt into ADR processes volun-
tarily.100 
If an ADR process is to be used, lawyers can help select the neutral.  In 
purely voluntary processes, lawyers rely on their networks to find names of 
mediators and arbitrators who they think would or would not be appropri-
ate.  Even when mediation or arbitration is court-ordered, lawyers can often 
help disputants make choices among lists of possible neutrals.  Beyond fa-
miliarity with the names and qualifications of particular neutrals, attorneys 
will typically be more knowledgeable than clients regarding the varying 
approaches neutrals might use, and better able to assess their usefulness in 
a particular dispute.101 
 
 100. See, e.g., David Plimpton, Mediation of Disputes: The Role of the Lawyer and How 
Best to Serve the Client’s Interest, 8 ME. B.J. 38, 41-44 (1993) (discussing the role a lawyer 
can play in helping a client decide among dispute resolution processes). 
 101. For example, attorneys can help guide their clients on the choice between more faci-
litative and more evaluative mediators.  See generally Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding 
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Once the neutral is selected, the lawyer can be very helpful in coaching 
the client in such matters as what to expect in mediation or arbitration,102 
who to bring as participants or witnesses,103 or what strategic moves might 
be desirable in either process.104  In arbitration, whether binding or non-
binding, attorneys can make the same kinds of decisions they make in liti-
gation, such as which witnesses to use and whether and how to present do-
cumentary evidence. 
The strategy in mediation is a form of negotiation strategy, and great 
thought should be given to how and whether to present information, solicit 
information, ask questions, make apologies, or make offers/demands.  Al-
though aspects of mediation may sometimes be confidential, depending 
upon relevant statutes, rules and contracts, information exchanged in medi-
ation may nonetheless be very important to litigation that later transpires if 
the dispute is not resolved.105  Attorneys can help with these tasks. 
One additional way attorneys can help clients succeed in mediation is to 
help them better understand their own situation and goals.  Although some 
may demonize attorneys, suggesting that they are only interested in heigh-
tening adversarial tensions or pursuing monetary relief, and although such 
may be an apt description of some attorneys, many other attorneys are very 
good at helping their clients to more fully understand their situation and to 
appreciate other parties’ concerns.  Psychologically, we all have a tendency 
to view the world through our own schema, predispositions, and stereo-
types.106  We also tend to be affected by “naïve realism” (an assumption 
that others see the world the way we do),107 and positive biases (that cause 
us to be overoptimistic108 and to overemphasize our own contributions to 
 
Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996). 
 102. See, e.g., Penelope Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: The Lawyer’s Role in Di-
vorce Mediation, 28 FAM. L.Q. 177, 210 (1994) (discussing ways lawyers can educate their 
clients with respect to the mediation process). 
 103. See, e.g., Kent B. Scott & Cody W. Wilson, Questions Clients Have About Whether 
(and How) to Mediate and How Counsel Should Answer Them, 63 DISP. RESOL. J., May-July 
2008, at 26, 33-34. 
 104. See generally ABRAMSON, supra note 3, at 95-124 (discussing lawyer’s role in medi-
ation); COOLEY, supra note 14, at 127-200; COOLEY, supra note 3, at 164-82 (discussing 
how lawyers can be effective in arbitration). 
 105. See, e.g., Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 265 (Cal. 2004) (holding that evi-
dence prepared for a mediation, including photographs, raw test data, and witness state-
ments was not discoverable in a subsequent action). 
 106. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good 
Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 437, 449-61 (2008). 
 107. Id. at 463-65. 
 108. Id. at 468-72. 
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group endeavors).109  Lawyers, while not entirely immune to such biases, 
are apparently less subject to some biases than are their clients.110  Further, 
when working with clients they can help clients to broaden their views and 
get beyond their biases.111 
2. Gathering and Presenting Factual Information 
Gathering and presenting legal and factual information is often a key as-
pect of both mediation and arbitration.  No matter how informal the 
process, disputants typically need to explain such matters as what hap-
pened, what relief they are seeking or seeking to avoid providing, and why 
they believe they are in the right and someone else is in the wrong. 
While some might believe that all such facts will already be in the dispu-
tants’ possession, often that is not the case.  For example, one kind of dis-
pute that is frequently mediated is marital dissolution.  Although the two 
spouses may be quite familiar with aspects of their family, neither of them 
may have complete knowledge with respect to their mortgage, the value of 
their property, their investments, or their pensions.  Lawyers are accus-
tomed to ferreting out information and working with accountants, and may 
be very useful in helping parties prepare for a mediation or arbitration.  Si-
milarly, while the disputants presumably know their children and each oth-
er quite well, lawyers may again be able to seek out other factual informa-
tion that could be relevant.  They may help obtain school, medical, or 
psychological records or seek out the assistance of a private investigator.  
In personal injury matters the attorney will likely be better at obtaining po-
lice reports, witness statements, and governmental agencies’ investigative 
reports with respect to the instant accident and other similar accidents.  
Even in seemingly simple disputes between neighbors, a lawyer can help 
obtain information, for example, regarding property lines or local noise or 
zoning ordinances.  While one obviously does not need to have a law de-
gree to make these sorts of factual inquiries, lawyers’ training and expe-
rience makes them better suited than many lay persons to engage in such 
factual investigations. 
Having gathered the facts, the lawyer can help make strategic arguments 
regarding which facts to disclose, as well as when and how such facts 
 
 109. Id. at 469-72. 
 110. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New 
Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 95-121 (1997). 
 111. See id.; see also Scott & Wilson, supra note 103 (discussing how attorneys can help 
their clients better understand the weaknesses as well as the strengths of their positions); 
COOLEY, supra note 14 (discussing that lawyers can use mediation to facilitate communica-
tion between clients).  Of course not all lawyers possess these skills, but some do. 
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should be disclosed.  In mediation, careful thought must be given to wheth-
er and how to convey information.  If the dispute is not resolved in media-
tion it may well be litigated, and it may or may not be wise to disclose all 
of one’s best litigation arguments in mediation.  In non-binding arbitration, 
similarly, the lawyer may decide not to present the entire case that might be 
presented in court.  And, assuming facts will be presented, lawyers can typ-
ically prepare both verbal and written versions of the facts that are much 
clearer, better organized, and more persuasive than the client might be able 
to manage on her own. 
3. Researching and Presenting Legal Arguments 
Although some may assume that legal arguments have no place, or less 
of a place, in ADR proceedings than in court, they would be wrong.  Medi-
ations often occur in the shadow of litigation, with disputants quite cogni-
zant that the case may proceed to litigation if it does not settle in media-
tion.112  Thus, the strength and weakness of legal arguments is highly 
relevant to determine whether a disputant ought to settle on particular 
terms.  For this reason, disputants, mediators, and of course the lawyers of-
ten focus explicitly on the strength and weakness of legal arguments during 
the mediation.  Arbitrations, of course, typically turn on legal arguments, 
merely substituting the arbitrator’s legal determinations for those of a 
judge.  Thus, in both forms of ADR lawyers can help a great deal in re-
searching and presenting legal arguments.113 
4. Empowering Clients 
In addition to the tasks outlined above, lawyers are poised to help their 
clients in the ways suggested by the Sandefur and Fox studies—
specifically, by providing emotional support and empowering their clients.  
Even in simpler ADR matters that do not involve complex facts or law, it 
may be very important for clients to be accompanied and supported by a 
person who can help them emotionally to tell their own story.  A large lite-
rature discusses this need as applied to minorities,114 women,115 and vic-
 
 112. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 973-77 (1979). 
 113. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 
YALE L.J. 1545, 1597-98 (1991) (explaining that counsel can assist client in avoiding reve-
lation of “privileged or irrelevant material,” which could hurt client later if mediation is un-
successful); Riskin, supra note 42, at 36-41 (discussing clients’ need for legal advice during 
and after mediation). 
 114. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of 
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 (1985). 
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tims of domestic violence.116  But it seems that the empowerment issue is 
likely much bigger than that: many disputants can benefit substantially 
from the assistance of an attorney to help them tell their own story, even in 
matters that may seem relatively simple in terms of facts and law. 
Some may imagine that mediations or arbitrations are so informal and 
comfortable that participants do not need any emotional support, except 
perhaps, from the neutral.  It is possible that some arbitrations and media-
tions have this nature.  Yet, as has been discussed, it is certain that many 
arbitrations and mediations have a much less warm and friendly atmos-
phere.117 
5. Drafting Agreements 
If an agreement is reached in mediation, the attorney can also help the 
client by drafting the actual mediation agreement.  As with any contract, 
lawyers can add a great deal, ensuring that the terms of the contract are 
clear, fair, and enforceable.118 
D. Neutrals Can’t Adequately Make Up for the Absence of 
Representation 
Some may believe that the neutral arbitrator or mediator can help the un-
represented disputant sufficiently, such that representation is not needed.119  
Stephan Landsman, in contrast, believes that arbitrators and mediators have 
less authority and ability to help unrepresented disputants than do courts.120  
I believe the truth lies somewhere in between.  Mediators often have re-
sponsibilities that are in tension with one another, both to remain impartial 
and also to ensure that parties are sufficiently well-informed that they can 
exercise self-determination.121  If mediators try too hard to help an unrepre-
 
 115. See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 113, at 1572-81. 
 116. Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 
40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992). 
 117. See Watson, supra note 6, at 15-21. 
 118. E.g., Plimpton, supra note 100, at 46. 
 119. See Rubinson, supra note 9, at 142-52 (asserting mediation can help solve access to 
justice problem). 
 120. Landsman, supra note 46. 
 121. The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, endorsed by the American Bar As-
sociation, the Association for Conflict Resolution, and the American Arbitration Associa-
tion, state that mediators shall support party self-determination and remain impartial.  MOD-
EL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS §§ I, II (2005), available at http://www.abanet. 
org/dispute/news/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfinal05.pdf.  The Standards also 
state that “[i]f a party appears to have difficulty comprehending the process, issues, or set-
tlement options, or difficulty participating in a mediation, the mediator should explore the 
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sented power they will put their impartiality at risk.  Arbitrators, on the 
other hand, feel essentially the same pressures as judges.  While they are 
permitted to help unrepresented disputants present their position, the arbi-
trator cannot become an advocate for the unrepresented disputant without 
losing her neutral stance in the adversarial process.  Thus, while both arbi-
trators and mediators may be able to help the unrepresented, neither, con-
sistent with their role, can help substantially in conducting legal or factual 
research, organizing factual information, presenting legal arguments, or 
providing emotional support. 
E. Will Adding Lawyers Undercut the Value of Mediation and 
Arbitration? 
Having laid out the potential benefits of having more lawyers represent 
clients in arbitration and mediation, it is also important to consider the 
possible counterargument, that adding lawyers to ADR processes will un-
dermine the very value of those processes.  Some fear that adding lawyers 
will make ADR processes too legalistic, formal, costly, and slow.  Certain-
ly there is some validity to this expressed fear–lawyers do not always know 
how to maximize the value of ADR processes.  In mediation, they may well 
focus too narrowly on purely legal issues or monetary relief.122  Or, they 
may run up the bill or encourage the client to settle or not settle for reasons 
that benefit the lawyer but not the client.123  In arbitration, similarly, law-
yers may overly complicate a process intended to be simple, by engaging in 
extensive discovery or filing lots of motions. 
Yet, while the concerns are valid, keeping lawyers out of ADR altogeth-
er is not the right solution.  Lawyers can be trained to do a better job in 
ADR, whether in law school or in subsequent CLEs.  While the training 
may not succeed in all cases, surely it is wrong to conclude that the training 
prospects are so bleak that we should assume lawyers hurt more than they 
help.  Many professional mediators have recognized that attorneys can be 
extremely helpful to the process of mediation,124 and no doubt most arbitra-
tors would prefer to handle hearings in which disputants are represented, 
rather than pro se.  Thus, we need to do what we can to train lawyers to be 
 
circumstances and potential accommodations, modifications or adjustments that would 
make possible the party’s capacity to comprehend, participate and exercise self-
determination.”  Id. at § VI(10). 
 122. See, e.g., Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions 
of Plaintiffs’ Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701 (2007) (presenting empirical research 
showing that plaintiffs’ aims in litigation are often different from those assumed by their 
attorneys); Riskin & Welsh, supra note 42, at 903-04; Sternlight, supra note 3, at 324-25. 
 123. See Sternlight, supra note 3, at 320-21, 327-28. 
 124. E.g., McEwen et al., supra note 20. 
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helpful in ADR processes, and ensure that attorneys are provided to those 
disputants who need them most, whether in ADR or in litigation. 
F. Non-Lawyer Representatives 
Assuming participants in mediation and arbitration could often benefit 
from representation, must that representation be supplied by an attorney?  
If non-lawyers could represent disputants’ interests in ADR as effectively, 
or even almost as effectively as attorneys, could not both disputants and so-
ciety as a whole save on the costs of legal representation? 
Certainly the point is worth considering.  Studies of litigation have 
shown that non-lawyer representatives can be as effective or sometimes 
more effective than attorneys, depending on their expertise and familiarity 
with the particular type of dispute.125  In mediation, similarly, the prelimi-
nary results seem to show that non-lawyer representatives can be helpful.126 
I believe that we should be rethinking the rules regarding unauthorized 
practice of law.  The rules restricting non-lawyers from providing legal as-
sistance, though perhaps often well-intended as a means to protect the pub-
lic from bad legal advice, at times may deprive persons of the only help 
they can afford.127 
Nonetheless, I believe it would be a mistake to accept the idea that non-
legal representation necessarily makes more sense in ADR processes than it 
does in litigation.  There is no reason to believe that mediation or arbitra-
tion require fewer legal skills and knowledge than litigation.  As has been 
discussed, the gathering and presentation of facts, and the research and 
presentation of legal arguments, can be just as important in ADR as in liti-
gation.  Similarly, the need for providing emotional support, self-agency, 
and an endorsement or reputational boost of the sort discussed by Sandefur 
may be just as great or even greater in mediation or arbitration than in liti-
gation.  The need for such support depends not only on the nature of the 
process, but rather on disparities in power and confidence between dispu-
tants.  Nor is it clear that non-lawyers are necessarily as good as lawyers in 
providing emotional support, confidence, or certainly reputational-
 
 125. KRITZER, supra note 41. 
 126. See Bingham et al., supra note 22, at 364-71 (finding that United States Postal Ser-
vice employees are more satisfied with representation by union representatives than by law-
yers, and that the lawyers, who appeared in only 3% of cases, did not settle as many cases 
completely as did the non-lawyers). 
 127. For a discussion of the Bar’s prohibition on “unauthorized practice of law” and the 
purported problems therewith, see RHODE, supra note 9, at 81-91. 
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bolstering to clients.128  While non-lawyers may well have superior emo-
tional skills to lawyers, disputants may feel more confident knowing that 
they are supported by an attorney, as opposed to a non-attorney.  Thus, ra-
ther than assume that the substitution of non-attorney-representatives for 
attorneys makes more sense in ADR than in litigation, we should rethink 
the rules on unauthorized practice of law with respect to all forms of dis-
pute resolution. 
III.  SO WHAT IS TO BE DONE?129 
Assuming readers are convinced that it can be very important to have le-
gal representation in ADR, what can we do to achieve this goal?  We do 
not have enough legal representation in litigation, and do not seem to be 
near the achievement of a civil Gideon.  Is it therefore a waste of time to 
focus on the need to provide counsel in ADR? 
While it is no doubt true that there are not enough lawyers to go around, 
drawing the line between litigation and ADR does not make sense.  Thus, it 
is unwise to base public policy on an assumption that we should not worry 
about legal representation in ADR until the need for legal representation in 
litigation is met.  But, given the substantial pro se phenomenon in litiga-
tion, how can we also hope to obtain legal representation in ADR?  Below, 
I offer suggestions to courts, policymakers, and legal providers. 
A. Courts Considering the Need for Counsel Should Rethink Their 
Focus on Adversarial Settings 
I heartily endorse the idea that attorneys may sometimes be constitution-
ally required in civil as well as criminal settings.130  As courts consider the 
extent to which attorneys may be needed in civil settings, I urge them to re-
consider the instinct that the need for representation correlates with the ex-
tent to which the process is adversarial.  As we have seen, the assumption 
of this correlation, while never expressly justified, permeates the body of 
Supreme Court decisions dealing with the right to counsel.  Yet, as has 
been discussed, perhaps the need for representation is greater in certain in-
formal settings than it is in more formal adversarial contexts.  Thus, as 
courts think about the extent to which non-legal representation can be suf-
 
 128. See Sandefur, supra note 80, at 25-26 (finding that attorneys were relatively more 
effective than non-attorney advocates in cases that were more complex). 
 129. With apologies to Lenin.  See VLADIMIR ILICH LENIN, WHAT IS TO BE DONE?: BURN-
ING QUESTIONS OF OUR MOVEMENT (1943). 
 130. See, e.g., Engler, supra note 1, at 78 (summarizing an argument for civil right to 
counsel). 
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ficient, in lieu of legal representation, they should recognize that while non-
legal representation can potentially be useful and appropriate, it is not nec-
essarily any more appropriate in ADR than it is in litigation. 
Courts should also consider the potential need for counsel in ADR 
processes in other contexts.  For example, courts deciding whether to make 
a particular ADR process mandatory should recognize that mandating an 
unrepresented person to appear in mediation or arbitration can sometimes 
be more problematic than allowing that person to continue unrepresented in 
litigation.  When courts, acting as regulators, set standards for the qualifica-
tion and training of ADR neutrals, they should similarly keep in mind the 
problems of unrepresented disputants.  Finally, courts creating rules that 
require persons to participate in mediation or arbitration “in good faith” or 
that establish confidentiality in ADR processes should, again, recognize 
that unrepresented persons may be affected by the rule. 
B. Policymakers Should Focus on the Need for Representation in 
ADR, and Not Only in Litigation 
If we are able to convince policymakers to increase the availability of at-
torneys, we should also convince them to focus on ADR as well as litiga-
tion.  I agree with Russell Engler that a blend of solutions is probably ap-
propriate to enhance access to justice.131  We can focus simultaneously on 
providing more attorneys and NLRs, and on helping those persons who 
proceed pro se.  But, as we engage in both endeavors we should remember 
that attorneys can be just as important in ADR as they can be in litigation. 
Commentator Rob Rubinson has proposed a different solution to the pro 
se phenomenon.132  Seemingly in conflict with the spirit of this Article, he 
suggests that mediation can be so conducive to pro se disputants that it can 
actually help solve the problem of pro se clients’ lack of access to jus-
tice.133  Yet, upon close reading, Rubinson’s argument is largely consistent 
with the ideas presented here.  Rubinson is very careful to contrast the 
“good” mediation that he proposes with the “bad” mediation that often ex-
ists.134  In essence, Rubinson proposes a model of mediation whereby me-
diators are well-trained, dedicated, and well-compensated; mediators are 
trained to help disputants find their own solutions rather than to impose so-
lutions; mediation caseloads are carefully controlled; sufficient time and 
 
 131. Id. at 81. 
 132. Rubinson, supra note 9. 
 133. Id. at 147-52. 
 134. Id. at 145, 152 (recognizing that mediation often will not be structured as he propos-
es). 
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space is afforded for mediation; staff is available to assist disputants in de-
ciding whether mediation is desirable; attorneys are welcome in the process 
but only if all parties are represented; a corps of attorneys are employed by 
the mediation program to advise disputants on available legal remedies and 
to review final agreements; the connection between courts and mediation 
programs is severed to avoid court-imposed settlement pressures; and all 
mediation services is provided for little or no cost to disputants.135  If such 
a program could exist, asserts Rubinson, disputants could be empowered to 
truly represent their own interests.136 
The pro se mediation program proposed by Rubinson is, in many ways, 
a beautiful dream.  Yet, I fear it will inevitably be corrupted and cheapened 
so that the mediation afforded to weaker poorer parties will not adequately 
represent their own interests.  Rubinson himself is very cognizant of this 
concern: “The crux, as always, is there is currently no mediation program 
that looks remotely like my proposal.  A process called mediation can be 
used for good or ill, and therein lurks the anger of proposals like mine.”137  
If mediation does not look as Rubinson proposes, I think he and I would 
agree that representation can be quite important to protect disputants’ inter-
ests. 
Policymakers should consider disputants’ potential need for attorneys in 
ADR processes not only as they examine the direct question of whether or 
when attorneys should be appointed in mediation or arbitration, but also as 
they consider other kinds of questions relating to such dispute resolution.  
Thus, as noted above with respect to courts, policymakers should recognize 
that disputants may be suffering from lack of representation when the poli-
cymakers consider such issues as whether to mandate ADR, what training 
and qualification standards ought to be set for neutrals, and what confiden-
tiality rules ought to be applied. 
C. Legal Services Organizations Should Rethink How Lawyers Are 
Used 
Skeptics may suggest that the reform measures discussed thus far are 
long term aspirations, if not pipedreams.  It may take some time before 
courts are willing to recognize a constitutional right to representation in 
civil ADR proceedings.  We do not seem poised to dramatically increase 
the availability of attorneys through either pro bono or government-funded 
efforts. 
 
 135. Id. at 147-51. 
 136. Id. at 142-43. 
 137. Id. at 152. 
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Does the analysis presented here have any use in our current world of 
very scarce resources?  In pondering this question it may be helpful to con-
sider how one legal services organization decided to allocate its attorneys 
between litigation and ADR.  While this is just one article, describing one 
particular legal services organization,138 the experience may provide an in-
sight as to how the provision of legal services can be reconceptualized. 
According to an article published in May 2006,139 Neighborhood Legal 
Services (“NLS”) in Massachusetts has taken a very innovative approach to 
how to allocate its scarce resources to tenants at risk of eviction.  The ar-
ticle explains: 
In a typical year the Housing Court Department, only one of two parts of 
the court system with jurisdiction over evictions, presides over more than 
20,000 evictions.  Many of the defendants are eligible for legal services 
because of their low incomes.  All are facing the imminent loss of their 
homes.140 
Faced with this great need, a legal services entity with limited staffing 
could choose to: (1) fully represent a very small number of clients (thereby 
helping a few but having an inconsequential impact on the bigger problem); 
(2) fully represent only clients in public or subsidized housing, rather than 
private housing, figuring that in those cases a subsidy as well as the tenan-
cy is at risk (still an inconsequential impact on the larger problem); or (3) 
offer self-help and legal education to the persons, such as private tenants, 
whom it cannot represent (on the hope that such programs can more effi-
ciently provide help to a larger number of tenants).141 
 For a time, NLS, like many other entities, took the approach of offering 
pro se clinics to teach tenants to write their own pleadings, and counseling 
on how to appear in court to present their side of the story.142  Perhaps 
more unusually, however, NLS also performed an extensive review of the 
success of its own program.  The review showed that the pro se clinics 
were not particularly useful: 
They found that these clients gained virtually nothing as a result of the 
advice, with no appreciable difference between the results achieved by 
low income tenants who had never seen the program and those that had.  
 
 138. Russell Engler cites other studies, some of which found that efforts to aid unrepre-
sented clients through workshops and other approaches could in fact be fairly effective.  
Engler, supra note 1, at 66-72. 
 139. Ross Dolloff & Patricio Rossi, Mediation Project Gets Results for North Shore Te-
nants, 16 LEGAL SERVS. REP., May 2006, at 1. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1, 12. 
 142. Id. at 12. 
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No matter how the program was tinkered with, the result was always the 
same.  It seemed that once immersed in the court process, these tenants, 
no matter how well trained and coached, succumbed to pressure to settle 
their case on unfavorable terms or were simply afraid to appear and con-
test the matter at all.143 
Working together with two other legal services entities, NLS staff there-
fore spent a year brainstorming how they might restructure their representa-
tion model to provide maximum assistance with minimum attorney hours.  
This rethinking took account of the facts that more than 90% of the eviction 
cases were settling in the court’s mandatory mediation program, that the 
mediations typically took place just minutes before a case was called for 
hearing and thus were highly charged and quite emotional, and that the 
courts were pressing hard to resolve disputes through settlement rather than 
at trial.144  The legal services staff noted: 
These forces conspire to work dramatically to the detriment of our client 
population, who often lack the education and sense of self, as well as an 
awareness of the rules of the system and of their rights in the landlord-
tenant relationship, to effectively overcome this pressure to capitulate and 
settle on any terms.  The fancy legal pleadings crafted skillfully by the 
lawyer in the traditional advocacy model are, then, never even looked at 
in the vast majority of cases.145 
Thus, the legal services program rethought their model of representation 
to try to “use the available attorney resources only for those tasks and 
events that are critical to the client’s success and either skip or have others 
perform the remaining tasks.”146  In this new model, representation in med-
iation becomes the attorneys’ key task.  The model uses non-lawyer advo-
cates to interview clients, provides limited assistance in a group setting to 
help clients draft their own pleadings and identify what documents to bring 
to court, and has attorneys review available information in advance but not 
actually meet with clients in advance.147  Then, the model uses the valuable 
attorney time to represent clients in every mediation.148  The attorneys use 
the mediation process “to facilitate achieving a fair agreement for the 
client, consistent with their needs, desires and their legal position in the 
case.”149 
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If the case is not resolved in mediation, the attorney may or may not 
continue to represent the client at trial.  The lawyer will continue represen-
tation at trial “only when the client was not offered a fair settlement based 
on the reality of the case. . . .”150  That is, clients who reject a fair settle-
ment will have to represent themselves at trial.  The designers of the pro-
gram believe it ensures “that every person who enters the housing court 
facing an eviction has a reasonable opportunity to get justice—not just 
access to the system, but substantive justice.”151 
Following the establishment of the program, known as the Mediation 
Project, the legal services group conducted an empirical study on its results 
by looking at 200 of the 400 tenants who had been served in an eight month 
period.152  The study found that the clients represented in mediation were 
far more successful than unrepresented clients.153  It also found that clients 
were extremely satisfied with the program.154 
Drawing on the inspiration of this Mediation Project, perhaps more at-
torneys, more courts, and more legal service entities can start to rethink 
which attorney services are most important.  Although we have traditional-
ly emphasized lawyers’ substantive and procedural knowledge in adver-
sarial processes, we can now see that lawyers play other extremely impor-
tant roles as well. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is natural to be attracted to the idea of a dispute resolution process in 
which persons can represent themselves.  The thought of needing to depend 
on someone else for representation is unappealing to many, both because 
individualism is such a strong value in our society155 and because we often 
believe that no person can understand our beliefs, needs, and desires as 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 14 (opining that use of a more traditional means of representation could have 
served only about one-third of these clients). 
 153. For example, “[i]n 29 percent of cases the eviction was denied unconditionally or 
temporarily denied subject to a probationary period.  In contrast, less than five percent of 
unrepresented clients are able to achieve these results.” Id.  Of the clients who were evicted, 
those with representation were permitted to stay in their homes for an average of nearly two 
months, whereas unrepresented defendants typically were allowed to remain less than three 
weeks.  Id. 
 154. On a three-point scale measuring the degree to which project services were “helpful” 
in achieving their positive results, clients, on average, rated the program 2.93.  Id. 
 155. Ayn Rand, author of The Fountainhead and many other works, is seen by many as 
one of the primary advocates of individualist philosophy. 
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well as we understand them ourselves.156  Certainly we can try to work to-
wards that ideal by creating dispute resolution processes that are conducive 
to self-representation.  If we are going to attempt to make mediation or 
even arbitration maximally conducive to self-representation we will need to 
think carefully about such issues as how the neutrals should be selected and 
trained, whether rules should be adopted to prevent intimidation of unre-
presented persons, and whether all kinds of disputes would be appropriate 
for such a process. 
In the short term, however, we should recognize that the nature of exist-
ing arbitration and mediation are often such that disputants may need attor-
ney representation.  While of course this Article does not suggest that at-
torney representation is always needed, it can nonetheless be said that 
attorneys can be very helpful both for their substantive and procedural 
knowledge and skills, and for the emotional and reputational support they 
can provide.  Certainly, it is wrong to assume that attorneys do not partici-
pate in ADR or that they cannot be helpful in ADR.  Non-lawyer represent-
atives can be effective too, but there is no reason to think they are more ap-
propriate in ADR than in litigation. 
The problem of needing representation in ADR is more pressing than 
ever given the growth of court-connected mandatory programs and given 
the high percentage of cases resolved through settlement.  Thus, rather than 
ignore this issue or wish it away, we must continue to do empirical work 
examining the need for attorney representation in ADR processes.  For 
now, we should assume that attorney representation in ADR may often be 
essential to allow disputants to achieve a just result. 
 
 156. Some of us may have more faith in our own ability to know and understand our-
selves, as illustrated by the high demand for therapists and psychologists. 
